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of the paper, which will maintain that expressivism construed as a philosophical account of the pragmatics of moral discourse is fully consistent with both the Reconception of Meta-Ethics Proposition and the Objectivity Proposition.Expressivism so construed is therefore fully consistent with moral realism as a moral doctrine. will further elucidate moral realism as a moral doctrine by highlighting the centrality of a minimalist conception of truth within it and by emphasizing that it calls for a reconception—rather than a repudiation—of meta-ethics. : 32–37, 40–51) Still, because this section of my paper will be focusing principally on Smith’s rejoinder to Dworkin, and because in any event Dworkin did not alter the gist of his critique of the error theory, I will quote here the passage by Dworkin that appears in Smith’s article: There are three available positions about most questions of moral right and wrong.Simon Blackburn re-joined our faculty in the Fall 2008 and will be with us one semester each year.
Thereafter, this paper moves to its chief endeavor.
By differentiating clearly between expressivism and quasi-realism (or moral realism as a moral doctrine), the paper highlights both their distinctness and their compatibility.
The general perception of the dialectic is that moral realists have the upper hand in semantics, but a disadvantage in metaphysics, and vice versa for moral antirealists. Simon Blackburn's quasi-realism is one of the principal examples of non-cognitivism, a form of moral antirealism that tries to develop an alternative account of moral semantics in which the function of a moral proposition is not to express belief but attitude.
Quasi-realism is Blackburn's research program of developing a semantics for moral discourse that is consistent with projectivism, the metaphysics of his metaethical theory.
In the second half of the paper, I will move even further away from Dworkin.
Although he was right to think that expressivism as he understood it is a moral doctrine, there is an alternative version of expressivism that is not in itself such a doctrine.
In so doing, it underscores the affinities between Blackburnian quasi-realism and moral realism as a moral doctrine.
Finally, this paper contends—in line with my earlier work on these matters—that moral realism as a moral doctrine points to the need for some reorienting of meta-ethical enquiries rather than for the abandoning of them..
It is a philosophical account of the pragmatics of such discourse.
Accordingly, it is entirely consistent with moral realism as a moral doctrine.