with an analysis of anti-corruption laws—the Ehtesab Ordinance, 1996, the Ehtesab Act, 1997, and the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999—, this article examines the entanglement of accountability procedures with the actual struggle over power, an entanglement so deep that it shapes both the constitution and the evolution of anti-corruption organizations.
with an analysis of anti-corruption laws—the Ehtesab Ordinance, 1996, the Ehtesab Act, 1997, and the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999—, this article examines the entanglement of accountability procedures with the actual struggle over power, an entanglement so deep that it shapes both the constitution and the evolution of anti-corruption organizations.Tags: Essay About The GlobalizationApp Development Business PlanCause Or Effect EssayHonors College ThesisSocial Work Courses SydneyResearch Papers On Breast Cancer
After a decade during which elected governments were regularly dismissed on grounds of corruption, Pakistan and its anti-corruption agencies have been overseen by four distinct governments since 1999.
First, the state came under direct military rule on October 12, 1999 when General Musharraf overthrew the elected government of Nawaz Sharif, initiating a period of “military regime.” Second, a transition from direct to indirect military rule took place in October 2002 when the Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid-i-Azam (PML-Q), under the patronage of the army, emerged as the majority party in the general elections and ruled the country for the next five years.
When supposedly independent state institutions are used to serve the interests of the governing party, this process is called “politicization” of institutions (Pierre 2004:3).
The politicization of state institutions takes place not only in recent states with hybrid regimes or defective democracies but also in old democracies with established rule-of-law traditions (Peters, Falk, and Pierre 2004).
The army has used anti-corruption agencies to hold civilian politicians accountable, while the sitting government has used them against political parties in the opposition.
Finally, the paper concludes that a high level of political animosity results in a high level of performance for accountability institutions.Comparative political studies portray full democracy as a cure for extremism (Brooks 2009), bad governance (Stockemer 2009) and corruption (Rock 2009).Yet in the case of Pakistan, many authors have considered the army an impediment to rather than a facilitator of the development of democracy (Shah 2014) and a supporter of Islamic extremism (Nasr 2004).Second, the paper uses new statistical data to show that the NAB, founded in November 1999, has tended to side with the interests of the parties and people in government.In much of the recent research in security studies, Pakistan has been viewed as a serious threat to the region and the world because of the risk posed by terrorist groups potentially gaining access to the country’s nuclear explosives (Blair 2011, Clarke 2013).Third, Musharraf’s loyalist party, the PML-Q, lost to its rival political parties in the February 2008 general elections, after a country-wide protest movement that contested Musharraf’s rule in 2007.The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) managed to form a coalition government and rule the country for the following five years (2008–2013).The paper focuses on some of Pakistan’s key institutions of governance—anti-corruption agencies—in order to find out whether a change of government brings about certain policy changes within anti-corruption agencies in favor of governmental political parties.Indeed, some authors have exposed the political use of anti-corruption agencies such as the NAB (Chêne 2008, Khan, Kakakhel, and Dubnick 2004), but these studies only highlight specific instances.the Ehtesab Cell (EC), was established by the November 1996 Ehtesab Ordinance promulgated by the caretaker government of Prime Minister Malik Meraj Khalid, and then operated under the elected government of Nawaz Sharif, who passed the Ehtesab Act, 1997.In November 1999, it was transformed by the National Accountability Ordinance into the National Accountability Bureau (NAB), after General Pervez Musharraf staged a military coup and proclaimed that his government would subject politicians and administrators to “ruthless” accountability (Musharraf 200).